Mea Culpa. I've been absent for a couple of weeks regarding posting, mostly due to a backlog of chaos. Irma and I are hoping it's under control again. We'll see, chaos has a way of following itself up with more chaos.
The FAA's been busy acting stupid, but hey, why should this month be any different than the last oh, say, 21 years? Denver Center's staffing continues to drop, and even though traffic is down over last year, we're getting tired. Having said that, I will also observe that some (okay, many) of the errors that have resulted are as much the result of dumb controller decisions as they are of fatigue. For those who've not heard me talk about this before, I should explain. At 'center level', an error occurs when two aircraft within the same altitude stratum (+ or - 1000ft of each other) pass within 5 horizontal miles of each other. Doesn't sound like much of a problem, except it's the standard we're held to. An operational error is considered a big deal, one error triggers a review of your skills, more can lead to retraining or practicing your phrase "you want fries with that?".
Some errors are just plain dumb luck, the result of a series of small mistakes that end up in an irreversible situation. Some are just plain Dumb Moves, the result of someone not paying attention or trying to take a chance. (ever see Pushing Tin? That movie was (besides just a plain bad example of controllers in general) filled with supposed controllers constantly taking stupid chances. I tried to watch it, never managed to get more than 10 minutes before I had to turn it off or risk permanent brain trauma). Anyway, hollywood image aside, Controllers don't last a full career if they continue to take stupid chances.
However, our illustrious management seems to think every error is the result of someone doing something deliberate. When the facility has a string of errors (such as this fall, where we've had 6 or so in as many weeks, compared to the usual 1 every month or two), they (upper level managers) feel that "they" have to do something. The results, imposed on all of the controllers, is always draconian, always pointless, and always punitive. Thus, fatigued controllers are piled on with mid level managers who are asked to wear their headsets (equipment that they only rarely use) and patrol up and down the aisle, ready to... "Take that drink off the console, it might spill." or "Is that aircraft on frequency? How about now? now? How about now???" or "Um, what's that flashing, you doing something?" Does upper level management think their mid levels will instantly recognize an error developing, plug in and save the day?
It only took me a few minutes to compose myself after reading that last line over. I suppose more explanation is in order. In my nearly 22 years of being an air traffic controller, I've never had an operational error. I suspect half of my coworkers are in the same boat. There's a core of perhaps 20 percent of the controllers I work with who've had multiple errors, probably accounting for 70% of the facilities errors. In todays FAA, however, management doesn't look at those who have multiple errors (unless certain conditions are met) and correct their actions. Instead, they blanket all of us with stupid restrictions and rules that do nothing but increase our stress levels. It reminds me of junior high, when someone in the back shot a rubber band at the teacher, and as a result, all of the class had to sit silently, doing nothing, until the end of class.
So pardon the cynicism. I'll reemphasize, We've a safe air traffic system. We're doing our best, with aging equipment and goofy bureaucratic rules and regulations, and guess what? They system works. Despite the bureaucracy. I only hope nationalized health care doesn't follow the path of typical gov't agencies...
On a writing note, Imperfect Hope continues to grind away slowly. I finished Cerryn's first two scenes (as a 9 year old), and set in on Randir's first scene (where he obtains his adult name). I've a lot of depth waiting to be added, and it seems to be the right track. I'll write more about it later this week, once I get the taste of FAA out of my mouth.
TTFN,
Jim
The FAA's been busy acting stupid, but hey, why should this month be any different than the last oh, say, 21 years? Denver Center's staffing continues to drop, and even though traffic is down over last year, we're getting tired. Having said that, I will also observe that some (okay, many) of the errors that have resulted are as much the result of dumb controller decisions as they are of fatigue. For those who've not heard me talk about this before, I should explain. At 'center level', an error occurs when two aircraft within the same altitude stratum (+ or - 1000ft of each other) pass within 5 horizontal miles of each other. Doesn't sound like much of a problem, except it's the standard we're held to. An operational error is considered a big deal, one error triggers a review of your skills, more can lead to retraining or practicing your phrase "you want fries with that?".
Some errors are just plain dumb luck, the result of a series of small mistakes that end up in an irreversible situation. Some are just plain Dumb Moves, the result of someone not paying attention or trying to take a chance. (ever see Pushing Tin? That movie was (besides just a plain bad example of controllers in general) filled with supposed controllers constantly taking stupid chances. I tried to watch it, never managed to get more than 10 minutes before I had to turn it off or risk permanent brain trauma). Anyway, hollywood image aside, Controllers don't last a full career if they continue to take stupid chances.
However, our illustrious management seems to think every error is the result of someone doing something deliberate. When the facility has a string of errors (such as this fall, where we've had 6 or so in as many weeks, compared to the usual 1 every month or two), they (upper level managers) feel that "they" have to do something. The results, imposed on all of the controllers, is always draconian, always pointless, and always punitive. Thus, fatigued controllers are piled on with mid level managers who are asked to wear their headsets (equipment that they only rarely use) and patrol up and down the aisle, ready to... "Take that drink off the console, it might spill." or "Is that aircraft on frequency? How about now? now? How about now???" or "Um, what's that flashing, you doing something?" Does upper level management think their mid levels will instantly recognize an error developing, plug in and save the day?
It only took me a few minutes to compose myself after reading that last line over. I suppose more explanation is in order. In my nearly 22 years of being an air traffic controller, I've never had an operational error. I suspect half of my coworkers are in the same boat. There's a core of perhaps 20 percent of the controllers I work with who've had multiple errors, probably accounting for 70% of the facilities errors. In todays FAA, however, management doesn't look at those who have multiple errors (unless certain conditions are met) and correct their actions. Instead, they blanket all of us with stupid restrictions and rules that do nothing but increase our stress levels. It reminds me of junior high, when someone in the back shot a rubber band at the teacher, and as a result, all of the class had to sit silently, doing nothing, until the end of class.
So pardon the cynicism. I'll reemphasize, We've a safe air traffic system. We're doing our best, with aging equipment and goofy bureaucratic rules and regulations, and guess what? They system works. Despite the bureaucracy. I only hope nationalized health care doesn't follow the path of typical gov't agencies...
On a writing note, Imperfect Hope continues to grind away slowly. I finished Cerryn's first two scenes (as a 9 year old), and set in on Randir's first scene (where he obtains his adult name). I've a lot of depth waiting to be added, and it seems to be the right track. I'll write more about it later this week, once I get the taste of FAA out of my mouth.
TTFN,
Jim
